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Assessment of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Operations




The operation of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) in the National Airspace System requires a careful consideration of the
operating philosophies to ensure a safe outcome for all users. Small UAS operations are explored while the associated risks and benefits
from the operations are reviewed. The operation of sUAS in self-separation airspace is discussed by an examination of the concept of
autonomous flight rules (AFR). This includes a presentation of the basic principles of AFR and an explanation of the requirement for a
sense-and-avoid system. Current and future uses of sUAS are presented to highlight the benefits from their use. Finally, an overview of
the major risks associated with the operation of sUAS is provided in the form of a risk assessment matrix and a hazard/risk process
decision chart. Mitigation actions to reduce the risks are also specified along with recommendations for further study.
Keywords: small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), autonomous flight rules (AFR), sense-and-avoid (SAA), risk assessment matrix, hazard/risk process decision chart
Introduction
Modern applications of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) have outpaced applicable regulations and continue to do so as
UAS regulations only now have recently been released. A major attempt at regulation provided in 2013 by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) introduced a roadmap for the integration of civil UAS and model aircraft in the National
Airspace System (NAS). The document specifically addressed small UAS (sUAS), and proposed a set of rules covering
their classification, registration, certification, and operation in the NAS (FAA, 2013).
Further regulatory guidance was provided by the FAA through Advisory Circular (AC) no. 107-2 released in June 2016.
The AC specified requirements for conducting sUAS operations in the NAS in accordance with Title 14 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 107. In the circular, an sUAS is defined as a ‘‘small unmanned aircraft (UA) and its
associated elements (including communication links and other aircraft components required for small UA airworthiness)
that are required for the safe and efficient operation of the small UA in the NAS’’ (FAA, 2016, p. 4–2). The FAA classi-
fication also includes the specification that the UA should weigh less than 55 pounds, and ‘‘can be flown without the
possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft’’ (p. 4–2). Furthermore, the AC helped provide clarity
to current and potential users of sUAS in the areas of pilot certification, aircraft registration and airworthiness, as well as in
any specific operational requirements for sUAS in the NAS.
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Small UAS have been commercialized extensively which
has allowed technological innovation for aircraft sizes less
than 1 kg (2.2 lbs) at prices comparable to those of smart
phones. The technology has also been successfully applied
in areas such as crop monitoring, mining, energy, infra-
structure, and transportation (Floreano & Wood, 2015).
In addition, UAS technology is expected to continue through
large technological innovations that will carry as large
an impact as that of how the mobile phone revolutionized
human activities and overall socio-economic life quality
(Odido & Madara, 2013). Regardless of how sUAS are
applied, their use would involve flights within controlled
and uncontrolled airspace. The flights within controlled
airspace will require authorization, and the FAA has the
responsibility to ensure all aircraft operations (including sUAS)
are conducted in a manner that ensures the safe and expedi-
tious flow of air traffic in that airspace (FAA, 2016).
Of the estimated 30,000 UAS in the NAS by year 2020,
a substantial number of aircraft will be under direct owner-
ship of law enforcement agencies (Farber, 2015). Current
advancements in technology have reduced the overall size
of UAS and introduced applications that could be easily
adapted to civilian use. For example, two separate studies
highlighted the anticipated pervasiveness of sUAS in civilian
applications: Frew and Brown (2009) projected that approxi-
mately 85% of the expected 1,500 civil UAS in service by
2017 will be sUAS, while Bloss (2014) found that the numbers
of civilians accepting sUAS use for various purposes were:
‘‘88 percent for search and rescue, 67 percent for security,
63 percent for crime fighting and 61 percent for com-
mercial applications’’ (p. 82).
The purpose of this paper is to present a basic review of a
proposal reflecting the viability of sUAS operations in the
NAS. A review of extant literature on UAS with emphasis
on sUAS will include basic descriptions of the concepts of
self-separation airspace, autonomous flight rules (AFR),
and sense-and-avoid (SAA) systems. Future uses of sUAS
are also described while possible challenges and issues that
could result from the operation will be identified. Finally,
a discussion of the possible benefits and risks of the opera-
tion of sUAS in self-separation airspace will be presented.
Literature Review
Small Unmanned Aerial Systems in the National
Airspace System
The FAA in 2016 published requirements that mandated
sUAS to possess the means to ‘‘see and avoid’’ other air-
craft. This helped to clarify some issues regarding the
integration of sUAS operations into the NAS. Among other
requirements, Federal Aviation Requirements 14 CFR
191.113 (Right of way rules, 2016) notes that ‘‘vigilance
shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so
as to ‘see and avoid’ other aircraft’’ (para. b). With this
provision from the regulation, pilots are required to self-
separate from other aircraft and maintain separation to
ensure they pass well clear of all air traffic (Cole et al.,
2013). Regarding the concept of self-separation, Wing and
Cotton (2011b) noted that it involves the use of on-board
systems and procedures by the pilot of an aircraft to
maintain safe and legal distances from other aircraft. Whilst
operating in self-separation airspace, it is assumed that
aircraft will be operating under AFR, which would be
distinct from the usual instrument flight rules (IFR) and
visual flight rules (VFR).
The basic principle of sUAS as it relates to their size and
weight might imply that this category of aircraft can be
operated anywhere with minimal restrictions. It is possible,
for example, that sUAS will operate in areas that are imprac-
tical for manned flight such as enclosed spaces, near power
cables, and very close to buildings and other obstacles
(Maroney, 2011). In theory, environments like the situa-
tions discussed above may not be part of the NAS, although
the FAA, being tasked with the safety of flight in public-
use NAS, has thus set requirements for the registration and
accountability for all sUAS operating in the NAS. Depend-
ing on the proposed area of operation for example, it may
be possible for individual operators and hobbyists to ope-
rate sUAS on their own property or within a specified area
up to a specific altitude (Logan, 2012).
Commercial applications of sUAS are concerned with
operators providing a service for profit and include aerial
photography, agriculture, and entertainment. Public use appli-
cations, on the other hand, are services that are used for the
overall public benefit and are not expected to receive any
form of compensation. Public use applications include law
enforcement, traffic monitoring, environmental monitoring,
and disaster response (Logan, Bland, & Murray, 2011).
Self-Separation Airspace and Autonomous Flight Rules
Zografos and Androutsopoulos (2011) noted that the main
aim of self-separation is to provide a sustainable solution
that can manage the projected increase in the volume of air
traffic. They further confirmed that self-separation features
the ‘‘delegation of the conflict detection and resolution task
from the air traffic controllers to the flight crew for a defined
part of the airspace’’ (p. 94). Self-separation requires air-
craft to self-position within the airspace using a combina-
tion of ground systems technologies and equipment onboard
the aircraft. Necessary airborne equipment includes Airborne
Separation Assistance System (ASAS) software, comple-
mented by the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
System, and Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
(ADS-B). The principle of operation assumes that all
aircraft will periodically broadcast information such as posi-
tion and velocity vector; all aircraft are thus able to self-
separate based on the information (Nakamura & Takeichi,
2016). Specifically, the ASAS software provides the appropriate
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guidance to ensure separation from other aircraft and from
other restricted airspace. The complementary ground systems
comprise the System Wide Information Management (SWIM)
system and the Traffic Information Service Broadcast
system (Wing & Cotton, 2011a). The SWIM system is also
an essential component of the FAA Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen) program.
Wing and Cotton (2011a) proposed that aircraft operating
under self-separation conditions comply with AFR. They
noted that self-separation is the primary enabling capability
for achieving the benefits of AFR operations. They further
classified AFR as ‘‘a structured flight mode with rules and
procedures that, while highly flexible, methodically ensures
separation safety with the utmost integrity’’ (p. 4). It is not
intended that AFR will replace IFR or VFR, but instead
consist of a new set of flight rules to exist along with IFR
and VFR. It should be possible to operate in accordance
with different sets of rules in one flight depending on the
nature and phase of flight. Self-separation will also allow
pilots to manage their flights regardless of the flight condi-
tions and with no air traffic control interventions. This should
help provide greater capacity for the airspace system (Wing
& Cotton, 2011b). It is also noted that all aircraft within
that airspace must be capable of self-separation so that the
ideals of self-separation can be realized.
Aircraft operating under AFR will be required to self-
separate from all other IFR, VFR and other AFR aircraft.
In addition, self-separation from obstacles, terrain, weather,
and any type of restricted airspace will be the responsibility
of the operator of the aircraft. The overall objective of the
AFR concept is to reduce risk and improve safety by
ensuring that traffic monitoring is available on multiple
airborne platforms (Wing & Cotton, 2011a).
Sense and Avoid Systems
The FAA AC no. 107-2 emphasizes the requirement
for UAS to see and avoid other aircraft (FAA, 2016). This
requirement can be fulfilled by an SAA system which must
‘‘offer a level of safety equaling or exceeding that of
manned aircraft’’ (Yu & Zhang, 2015, p. 153). An SAA
system can be described as an airborne system capable ‘‘of
determining the presence of potential collision threats, and
maneuvering clear of them’’ (Prats, Delgado, Ramirez,
Royo, & Pastor, 2012, p. 677). A UAS requires an SAA
system to provide self-separation and collision avoidance
between the UAS and other aircraft or hazards, like the
‘‘see and avoid’’ provision with manned aircraft (Jamoom,
Joerger, & Pervan, 2016; Zeitlin, 2010).
The development of an SAA system capability is one
of the major challenges to the integration of sUAS into
the NAS (Cole et al., 2013; Prats et al., 2012; Yenson,
Cole, Jessee, Crowder, & Innes, 2015). SAA systems can
be either ground-based (GBSAA) or airborne (ABSAA).
GBSAA systems use available ground-based radars but are
limited to the operational region of the UAS while ABSAA
systems are considered long term and can operate without
the geographical limitations of GBSAA (Cole et al., 2013).
Due to the small size and characteristics of sUAS, tradi-
tional SAA systems may not be suitable for sUAS to meet
the regulatory requirements. Stark, Stevenson, and Chen
(2013) noted that there is a lack of specific SAA systems
for sUAS, and suggested that ADS-B integration would
complement sense and avoid operations.
Future Applications of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems
Applications of sUAS have been demonstrated in agri-
culture, and the current evidence suggests that this use will
likely increase (Khot & Zhou, 2016; Ladd & Bland, 2009;
Rasmussen, Nielsen, Garcia-Ruiz, Christensen, & Streibig,
2013). Ladd and Bland (2009) categorized the future uses
of sUAS under commercial and scientific applications.
The commercial applications they highlighted included
traffic information gathering, cell phone relay towers, news
reporting, and advertising applications. The main scientific
applications of sUAS they identified were related to agri-
culture. This included applications in grain crops, vineyard
applications, and organic agriculture. Forestry measure-
ment, management of wetland coastlines, aerial chemistry
technology, and mapping of cities using LiDAR (light
detection and ranging) were also identified as future
scientific applications.
The jobs that sUAS could be tasked to carry out were
identified by Bloss (2014) as: ‘‘security, safety and resource
management at mines and quarries, search for missing on
mountains and agricultural tasks such as mapping, cloud
diagnostics and parasite and disease monitoring’’ (p. 82).
Floreano and Wood (2015) also described some potential
uses of sUAS. These are summarized in Table 1. From the
uses listed, the benefits of sUAS are especially important in
the delivery of time-sensitive goods and services under
conditions that are continuously changing. In addition to
this, it also seems likely that their future use will include
applications in industries as diverse as medical, agriculture,
construction, security, and petroleum.
Amazon, the electronic commerce company, indicated a
desire in December 2013 to launch a fleet of UAS within
five years to be used in the delivery of packages. While this
appears to be a laudable aim, there are significant chal-
lenges before this can be achieved. Specifically, Burzichelli
(2016) identified the challenges that Amazon could face as:
‘‘prohibitive federal regulations, underdeveloped state regula-
tion, growing privacy concerns, and legitimate safety
concerns’’ (p. 162).
Risks of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Use
Although sUAS may face certain risks that are like those
of manned aircraft, they are also subject to risks that are
K. O. Kasim / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering 69
specific to their operation. The overall risk of sUAS to air
traffic was assessed as moderate by Stark et al. (2013) who
noted that sUAS ‘‘are atypical of manned aircraft opera-
tions’’ (p. 157). One of the main risks in sUAS operations is
related to the safety of other airspace users, either onboard a
manned aircraft or on the ground. This can be exacerbated
by the conduct of sUAS operations by persons with limited
aviation training (Cho, 2014). The FAA has published
guidelines to ensure that persons wishing to operate sUAS
in the NAS possess the appropriate aviation knowledge.
Maroney (2011) also suggested that the risk can be miti-
gated by the restriction of sUAS to specific airspace where
there are no manned flights. Regarding the risk to persons
on the ground, he suggested the use of operational restric-
tions such as controlling the movement of persons within
the flight path, and design features such as frangibility or
the use of parachutes. Frangibility ensures that the sUAS
can break up into smaller parts, while parachutes will allow
flights to be terminated easily.
Method
An assessment of the potential risks associated with
sUAS operations was conducted using the safety risk
management philosophy as described by ICAO (2013).
Safety risk management is an essential component of any
aviation activity, and sUAS operations require appropriate
techniques. The purpose of safety risk management is to
‘‘assess the risks associated with identified hazards and
develop and implement effective and appropriate mitiga-
tions’’ (ICAO, 2013, p. 2–30). Each potential risk was allo-
cated a risk index as per the ICAO safety risk assessment
matrix. Following the application of necessary measures
to reduce the risk, a resulting risk index for the hazard is
presented.
The process followed to identify and quantify the hazards
was adapted from Stolzer and Goglia (2015) and is shown
in Figure 1. A hazard/risk process decision program chart
for the major risks associated with sUAS operations was
also developed.
Results and Discussion
The risk assessment matrix shown in Table 2 reflects the
risk acceptability of the generic hazards of sUAS operations.
The generic hazards were selected by the author based
on listings of the expected top risks of sUAS operations.
The result will be discussed by considering one hazard.
Table 1
Future uses of small unmanned aerial systems.
Industry Application
Agriculture Continuously monitor quality of crop growth
Mining Obtain precise volumetric data of excavations
Energy and infrastructure Survey pipelines, roads, and cables
Humanitarian organizations Assess and adapt aid efforts in continuously changing camps
Transportation Allow rapid delivery of essential goods and services
Emergency services Assess dangers in confined spaces safely and rapidly
Road maintenance Measure signs of wear and tear in bridges and tunnels
Security Monitor areas outside the range of surveillance cameras
Telecommunication Drone networks can be used to temporarily supplement or replace points of service
Note. Adapted from Floreano and Wood (2015), p. 460.
Figure 1. Hazard identification process. Adapted from Stolzer and Goglia (2015).
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For example, the presence of inexperienced operators in
self-separation airspace was determined to be a potential
hazard. The likelihood of an inexperienced operator was
assessed as remote, meaning it is unlikely to occur, but
possible. The corresponding risk probability is ‘‘3.’’ The
safety risk severity was assessed as ‘‘A,’’ meaning equip-
ment destroyed and/or multiple deaths. The overall risk
index is therefore 3A which means that it is unacceptable
for this operation to proceed. The choices before the oper-
ator are therefore as follows: take measures to reduce the
exposure to the risk, take measures to reduce the severity
of consequences, or cancel the operation (ICAO, 2013).
The next step in this process seeks to identify appro-
priate measures to reduce this risk. Some actions outlined
by the FAA (2017) to deter unsafe UAS operations include
identification of witnesses and operators, viewing and
recording locations, immediate notification, and evidence
collection. In this case, it was considered that enforcing
sUAS pilot qualification standards, introducing operational
restrictions, and including an additional observer during
specific missions are measures that could be applied.
A re-evaluation of this risk resulted in a risk index of 3D,
which is acceptable with mitigation. This operation can
therefore proceed but the mitigation strategies must be
strictly enforced. The implication is that if any of the mitiga-
tion measures are unavailable or unworkable, the operation
cannot proceed. The other major hazards identified were
sUAS malfunction or lost link due to bandwidth, mid-air
collision with other sUAS, object or manned aircraft, and
collision with objects or other persons on the ground. These
hazards were all assessed with an initial risk index of 3A,
which is unacceptable. Following the application of mea-
sures to reduce risk, the resulting risk index was adjudged
acceptable with mitigation (3D).
The hazard/risk process decision chart for major hazards
in sUAS operations showing the initial risk index and the
resulting risk index after the mitigation measures is shown
in Figure 2.
The safety risk assessment process is an integral part of
the safety management system (SMS) of air transport
operators. Since the nature of air transport and aviation
operations implies that there is some element of risk
involved, an operator must conduct and document this
process for its own use, and to fulfil regulatory require-
ments. Small UAS pilots or operators have the responsi-
bility to ensure their operations have developed appropriate
Table 2
Safety risk assessment matrix.
Risk Probability Risk Severity
Catastrophic A Hazardous B Major C Minor D Negligible E
Frequent 5 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E
Occasional 4 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E
Remote 3 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
Improbable 2 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E
Extremely 1
improbable
1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
Note. Adapted from ICAO (2013), p. 2–29. , Unacceptable; , Acceptable with mitigation; , Acceptable.
Figure 2. Hazard/risk process decision chart for sUAS operations. Developed by the author.
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‘‘risk acceptance procedures, including acceptance criteria
and designation of authority and responsibility for risk
management decision making’’ (FAA, 2016, p. A–4).
Conclusion and Recommendations
The focus of this paper identifies safety risk management
as one of the four components of safety management, the
others being safety policy, safety assurance, and safety
promotion. It is essential that all components are in place
for an effective SMS (FAA, 2015).
The FAA has attempted to address the proliferation of
UAS and sUAS by updating current regulations and by
releasing operational guidelines. Guidance on the operation
of sUAS in the NAS was provided by the FAA through the
publication of AC no. 107-2. It is important to note that
the overriding objective of the regulations is to ensure a
safe operating environment for all airspace users. The assess-
ment of sUAS operations discussed in this paper focused
on the potential uses and the associated risks. The concept
of AFR airspace and how it can provide airspace users with
a functional alternative to the two standard flight rules
(VFR and IFR) is also discussed. AFR also supports the
NextGen vision for self-separation (Wing & Cotton,
2011a).
Although the presented hazard/risk process decision
chart presented in this paper is not expected to be a com-
prehensive list of all sUAS hazards in self-separation
airspace, it highlights the greatest risks and provides a brief
overview of sUAS operations. While the pilot in command
ultimately has the overall responsibility for air transport
operations, all personnel connected with the operation
should be involved in the analysis of the risks before the
commencement of the operation. It is recommended that
further studies be conducted on the use of SAA techno-
logies in reducing the risk of sUAS operations. Further
studies are also proposed in the form of detailed root cause
analysis and cost–benefit analysis to properly evaluate the
concepts.
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